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Abstract
We study the effectiveness of various approaches that defend against adversarial attacks on
deep networks via manipulations based on basis function representations of images. Specifi-
cally, we experiment with low-pass filtering, PCA, JPEG compression, low resolution wavelet
approximation, and soft-thresholding. We evaluate these defense techniques using three types
of popular attacks in black, gray and white-box settings. Our results show JPEG compression
tends to outperform the other tested defenses in most of the settings considered, in addition to
soft-thresholding, which performs well in specific cases, and yields a more mild decrease in
accuracy on benign examples. In addition, we also mathematically derive a novel white-box
attack in which the adversarial perturbation is composed only of terms corresponding a to pre-
determined subset of the basis functions, of which a “low frequency attack” is a special case.
1 Introduction
In the past five years, the areas of adversarial attacks (Szegedy et al., 2013) on deep learning models,
as well as defenses against such attacks, have received significant attention in the deep learning
research community (Yuan et al., 2017; Akhtar & Mian, 2018).
Defenses against adversarial attacks can be categorized into two main types. Approaches of the
first type modify the net training procedures or architectures, usually in order to make the net com-
pute a smooth function; see, for example (Shaham et al., 2015; Gu & Rigazio, 2014; Cisse et al.,
2017; Papernot et al., 2016b). Defenses of the second type leave the training procedure and archi-
tecture unchanged, but rather modify the data, aiming to detect or remove adversarial perturbations
often by smoothing the input data. For example, Guo et al. (2017) applied image transformations,
such as total variance minimization and quilting to smooth input images. Dziugaite et al. (2016);
Das et al. (2017) proposed to apply JPEG compression to input images before feeding them through
the network. Closely related approaches were taken by Akhtar et al. (2017), by applying the Dis-
crete Cosine Transform (DCT) and by Bhagoji et al. (2017); Hendrycks & Gimpel (2017); Li & Li
(2016), who proposed defense methods based on principal component analysis (PCA). De-noising
using PCA, DCT and JPEG compression essentially works by representing the data using a subset
of its basis functions, corresponding to the first principal components, in case of PCA, or low fre-
quency terms, in case of DCT and JPEG. A similar idea can be applied by low-pass Fourier filtering
and wavelet approximation.
∗Equal contribution.
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In this manuscript, we continue in this direction, by investigating various defenses based on ma-
nipulations in a basis function space. Specifically, we experiment with low-pass filtering, wavelet
approximation, PCA, JPEG compression, and soft-thresholding of wavelet coefficients. We ap-
ply each of these defenses as a pre-processing step on both adversarial and benign images, on the
Inception-v3 and Inception-v4 networks. The defenses are applied only at test time (so that we do
not re-train or change the publicly available network weights), and for each defense we evaluate
its success at classifying adversarial images, as well as benign images. We evaluate these defenses
in black, gray and white-box settings, using three types of popular attacks. In a black-box setting
the attacker has no access to the gradients and no knowledge of the pre-processing procedure. In
a gray-box setting, the attacker has access to the gradients of the attacked network, however he
does not have any knowledge of defenses being applied. In a white-box setting, the attacker has
access to the gradients, as well as full knowledge of the pre-processing procedure taking place. Our
results show that JPEG compression performs consistently as well as and often better than the other
defense approaches in defending against adversarial attacks we experimented with, across all types
of adversarial attacks in black-box and gray-box settings, while also achieving high performance
under two different white-box attack schemes. Soft-thresholding has the second best performance
in defending against adversarial attacks, while outperforming JPEG compression on benign images.
In addition, we also mathematically derive a novel type of attack, in which the adversarial
perturbation affects only terms corresponding to pre-specified subset of the basis functions. We
call this approach a “filtered gradient attack”. Several cases of special interest of this attack are
when this subset contains only low frequency basis functions, coarse level wavelet functions, or
first principal components.
The remainder of this manuscript is organized as follows. In Section 2 we review the attacks
used in our experiments, whereas in Section 3 we review our defense approaches. Our experimental
results are provided in Section 4. Section 5 briefly concludes the manuscript.
2 Attacks
In this manuscript we experiment with three popular adversarial attacks.
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) (Goodfellow et al., 2014) is a fast method to generate an
adversarial perturbation, where the perturbation is performed by either adding or subtracting a fixed
amount from each image pixel, depending on the sign of the corresponding entry in the gradient
of the loss function with respect to the image. Specifically, for an image x with true label y, the
adversarial image is x′ = clip(x+ ∆x), and the adversarial perturbation ∆x is given by
∆x =  · sgn (∇xJθ,y(x)) ,
where sgn performs elementwise and Jθ,y(x) denotes the loss of a network with parameter vector
θ on (x, y), viewed as a function of x (i.e., holding θ and y fixed). This perturbation can be derived
from a first-order Taylor approximation of J near x,
max
∆x
Jθ,y(x+ ∆x) ≈ Jθ,y(x) + 〈∇xJθ,y(x),∆x〉,
maximized by choosing ∆x from a `∞ ball of radius  (Shaham et al., 2015). The radius  corre-
sponds to the magnitude of the perturbation.
Iterative Fast Gradient Sign Method (I-FGSM) (Kurakin et al., 2016) works by repeated appli-
cations of the FGSM perturbation
x(m) = clip
(
x(m−1) +  sgn ·∇xJθ,y(x(m−1))
)
,
and setting the adversarial image to be x′ = x(M), the output of the last iteration.
Carlini-Wagner (C&W) is a family of attack methods, which typically yield perturbations of
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Figure 1: Top: a benign example, FGSM, I-FGSM and C&W adversarial examples, along with
their top 1 prediction and confidence score. Bottom: the corresponding adversarial perturbations,
multiplied by 50 for visibility.
.
small magnitude. They utilize a margin which enables one to generate adversarial examples which
are subsequently misclassified with high confidence. Following Guo et al. (2017), we use the C&W
`2 variant
min
x′
[‖x− x′‖2+
λf max
(−κ, Z(x′)f(x) −max {Z(x′)c : c 6= f(x)}) ,
where κ is a margin, which will be explained later, c is a class index, f(x) is the network prediction
on x, Z(x) is the logit (i.e., pre-activation of the softmax output layer) for x and λf is a trade-off
parameter. The left-most max term of the C&W loss corresponds to the most probable class which
is not the originally predicted one. For κ = 0, the left part of the loss is minimized when there
is a class c which is not the original predicted class f(x), and whose logit is at least as big as the
logit of the true class. Increasing the margin κ requires that the gap between the logits increases
correspondingly, resulting in a high confidence adversarial example. In our experiments we use
κ = 0. The fact that C&W perturbations are typically small in magnitude is a result of minimizing
the squared difference ‖x− x′‖2. Unlike FGSM and I-FGSM examples, C&W examples are much
slower to generate, requiring applying an optimizer for each adversarial example.
Figure 1 shows a benign image, adversarial images generated using the FGSM, I-FGSM and
C&W methods and the corresponding perturbations generated by those methods. The adversarial
perturbations were generated using the Inception-v3 network.
3 Defenses
We experiment with several defense methods, all of which operate by performing manipulations in
basis function spaces. Below we describe each of the defenses used in our experiments. Further
technical details are given in Section 4.1.
Low-pass filtering: The discrete Fourier transform of a two-dimensional signal (e.g., an image)
3
Figure 2: Examples of the defense methods used in this manuscript, applied on the FGSM adver-
sarial image in Figure 1.
.
xn1,n2 , ni = 1, . . . Ni is defined by
Xk =
N−1∑
n=0
xne
−2pii〈k,(n/N)〉,
where n = (n1, n2), k = (k1, k2), N− 1 = (N1 − 1, N2 − 1) and n/N = (n1/N1, n2/N2).
Low pass-filtering is performed by obtaining the Fourier representation of the image, followed
by element-wise multiplication of the Fourier coefficients Xk with a bump function, so that high
frequencies are depressed, and lastly converting the signal back to pixel space using the inverse
transform.
PCA: PCA de-noising represents a given matrix by a low-rank approximation of it, while keeping
as much variance as possible in the original data matrix (whose rows are viewed as data points
and columns as input features). This is done by obtaining the principal components of a matrix,
representing the data in the PC space, discarding all but the k leading principal directions and
mapping the data back to its input space. Mathematically, this procedure is formalized by
Xpca = XUU
T ,
where X is n× d matrix where each row corresponds to a data point, and U is a d× k matrix con-
taining the leading k eigenvectors of the d×d covariance matrix 1n (X−X¯)T (X−X¯). Rather than
computing the PCA on the entire image dataset, as was done by Bhagoji et al. (2017); Hendrycks &
Gimpel (2017); Li & Li (2016), we compute the principal components for each image separately,
in two different ways:
• Viewing the image as a matrix of size nrows×ncolumns, i.e., where rows are considered as data
points, and performing PCA denoising on that matrix.
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• We cut patches from each image, re-shape each patch to a vector and obtain a matrix whose
rows are the patch vectors. We then perform PCA denoising on that matrix.
in both cases, we apply the denoising on each color channel separately.
Wavelet approximation: Unlike complex exponentials, the Fourier basis functions, wavelet basis
functions are localized. Wavelet basis on R2 is an orthonormal collection {ψk,b} of zero-mean
functions, created from a bump function ϕ(x) : R2 → R (“father wavelet”) via
ψ(x) = ϕ(x)− 2−1ϕ
(
2−
1
2x
)
and
ψk,b(x) = 2
k
2ψ
(
2
k
2 (x− b)
)
.
The index k corresponds to the level of approximation (via the width of the bump) and b to the
shift. Wavelet decomposition of a real-valued signal f : R2 → R is represented as sequences
of coefficients, where the kth sequence describes the change of the signal at the kth level, and
k = 1, 2, . . .. f is then represented as
f(x) =
∑
k∈Z
∑
b∈Z
〈f, ψk,b〉ψk,b(x).
Discrete wavelet transform is a wavelet transform where the wavelets are discretely sampled. Since
wavelet functions are localized, a wavelet basis is often better than the Fourier basis at representing
non-smooth signals, yielding sparser representations. For 2D images, level k wavelet approxima-
tion results in an approximation image of resolution which is coarser as k grows, containing 2−2k
of the pixels of the original image. To resize the approximation image back to the original size, we
use bi-cubic interpolation, implemented via Matlab’s imresize function.
Soft-thresholding: Donoho & Johnstone (1994) consider a setting where one wishes to recon-
struct a discrete signal f from a noisy measurement x of it, where
xi = f(ti) + σzi,
zis are iid standard Gaussian random variables, i = 1, . . . , n and ti = i/n. They propose to de-
noise x using soft-thresholding of its wavelet coefficients, where the soft-thresholding operator is
defined by
η(c) = sgn(c) max{0, |c| − t}
and t is a threshold, usually chosen to be
t = σ
√
2 log n.
A classical result by Donoho (1995) proves that such de-noising is min-max optimal in terms of `2
distance ‖fˆ − f‖ between the de-noised signal fˆ and the original one, while keeping fˆ at least as
smooth as f .
JPEG compression: JPEG is a lossy compression that utilizes DCT and typically removes many
high frequency components, to which human perception is less sensitive. Specifically, JPEG com-
pression consists of the following steps:
1. Conversion of the image from RGB format to Y CbCr format, where the Y channel represents
Luminance and Cb, Cr channels represent chrominance.
2. Down-sampling of the chrominance channels.
3. Splitting of the image to 8× 8 blocks and applying 2D DCT to each block. This is done for
each channel separately.
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4. Quantization of the frequency amplitudes, achieved by dividing each frequency term by a
(different) constant and rounding it to the nearest integer. As a result, many high frequency
components are typically set to zero, and others are shrinked. The amount of compression is
governed by a user-specified quality parameter, defining the reduction in resolution.
5. Lossless compression of the block data.
The lossy elements of JPEG compression are the down-sampling (step 2) and the quantization (step
3), where most of the compression is achieved. JPEG defense was applied by Dziugaite et al.
(2016); Das et al. (2017); Guo et al. (2017).
In the case of color images, Fourier and wavelet transforms are typically applied on each color
channel separately. Figure 2 demonstrates the above defense methods on the panda image of Fig-
ure 1.
4 Experiments
4.1 Setup and Technical Details
Our experiments were performed on the publicly available dataset from the NIPS 2017 security
competition1, containing 1000 images, as well as a trained Inception-v3 model. All attacks were
carried out using Cleverhans2. For C&W we used with κ = 0 and λf = 0.02, and similarly to (Guo
et al., 2017), the perturbations were multiplied by constant  ≥ 1 to alter their magnitude. FGSM
and I-FGSM attacks were performed with  ∈ [0.005, 0.09]. The parameters of each of the defenses
were selected to optimize the performance of the defense in a gray-box setting. Specifically, the
low-pass filtering was applied by multiplying the Fourier coefficients of each color channel with a
circle with radius of 65; PCA was performed by retaining the largest 36 principal components of
each image; Patchwise PCA was performed on patches of size 13× 13, and retaining the largest 13
principal components; JPEG compression was performed by setting the quality parameter to 23%.
Wavelet approximation was performed in Matlab using the appcoef2 command; soft-thresholding
was done using Matlab’s ddencmp and wdencmp; for both approaches we used the bi-orthogonal
bior3.1 wavelet. In all experiments the adversarial examples were generated using the Inception-
v3 network. We did not perform any re-training or fine-tuning of the net. All defenses were
applied as test time pre-processing methods. Our codes are available at https://github.
com/KlugerLab/adversarial-examples.
4.2 Evaluation
Following Guo et al. (2017), for each defense we report the top-1 accuracy versus the normalized
`2 norm of the perturbation, defined by
1
n
n∑
i=1
‖xi − x′i‖2
‖xi‖2 ,
where x and x′ denote benign and adversarial examples respectively, and n is the number of exam-
ples.
4.3 Black-Box Setting
In this setting, the attacker has no access to the gradients of the target network. Rather, the attack
is based on the transferability property of adversarial examples (Liu et al., 2016; Papernot et al.,
2016a). Specifically, we generated adversarial examples generated for Inception-v3, applied each
1https://www.kaggle.com/c/nips-2017-defense-against-adversarial-attack/data
2https://github.com/tensorflow/cleverhans/
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Figure 3: Top 1 accuracy of each of the defense methods investigated in this manuscript on FGSM,
I-FGSM and C&W adversarial examples, in a black-box setting. The examples were generated
using Inception-v3 and tested on Inception-v4.
of the defenses (separately) on each adversarial example, fed them into Inception-v4, and measured
the top 1 accuracy. Figure 3 shows the performance of each defense method as a function of the
normalized `2 norm of the perturbation, for each of the attack methods. Overall, we found that
in our experiment setup, transferability actually requires fairly large perturbations comparing to
a gray-box setting (see Section 4.4)3. Adversarial examples with perturbations of normalized `2
norm below 0.08 generally only yield a modest decrease in accuracy. Consequently, all the tested
defenses are ineffective against small perturbations in this setting. JPEG denoising becomes effec-
tive around 0.08 against FGM and I-FGM attacks, where it outperforms all other defenses, however
does not perform well against C&W attacks. Soft-thresholding becomes effective against I-FGM
and C&W attacks for norms above 0.08. Low-pass filtering and the PCA denoising methods do not
perform well against any attack. In addition, Table 1 displays the performance of each of the de-
fenses on benign examples using Inception-v4. As can be seen, the wavelet-based methods (level
1 approximation and soft-thresholding yield the smallest decrease in accuracy on benign exam-
3We found that the largest normalized `2 we consider in the black-box case corresponds to about 2/3 of the one used
by Liu et al. (2016). We chose not to use larger perturbations as these become fairly noticeable to a human eye, and hence
less adversarial.
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Defense Top 1 accuracy
No defense 0.967
Low-pass filter 0.89
PCA 0.853
JPEG 0.912
Level 1 wavelet approximation 0.933
Soft-thresholding 0.941
Patchwise PCA 0.811
Table 1: Performance of the defenses on benign examples on Inception-v4. The performance of
each defense on adversarial examples is shown in Figure 3.
Defense Top 1 accuracy
No defense 0.956
Low-pass filter 0.855
PCA 0.796
JPEG 0.883
Level 1 wavelet approximation 0.901
Soft-thresholding 0.911
Patchwise PCA 0.73
Table 2: Performance of the defenses on benign examples on Inception-v3. The performance of
each defense on adversarial examples is shown in Figure 4.
ples, followed by JPEG. Low-pass filtering and PCA methods yield a more significant decrease in
accuracy.
4.4 Gray-Box Setting
In this setting, the attacker has access to the gradients of the target network, but is not aware of the
defenses applied. Specifically, we used the FGSM, I-FGSM and C&W examples generated for the
Inception-v3 network, applied each of the defenses (separately) on each adversarial example, fed
them back into Inception-v3, and measured the top 1 accuracy. The results are shown in Figure 4.
As can be seen, JPEG denoising performs for the most part as well as or better than all other
methods, consistently across all attacks and all perturbation magnitudes. In the FGSM case, as the
magnitude of the perturbation gets large, soft-thresholding and patchwise PCA outperform JPEG
denoising.
To complete the evaluation of the defenses in this setting, we also measure the performance of
each of the defenses on benign examples, which is shown in Table 2. The results are consistent with
these of Table 1, however the network seems to be more sensitive to the defenses; for example, soft-
thresholding yields a 4.5% decrease in accuracy, comparing to 2.6% in Table 1 and JPEG denoising
yields 7.3% decrease, comparing to 5.5% in Table 1.
4.5 White-Box Setting
In this setting, the attacker has access to the gradients of the target network, and also has full
knowledge of the defense being applied. Below we present two specific schemes where we utilize
this knowledge.
Filtered Gradient Attack (FGA): Let x ∈ Rd, and let D ∈ Rd×k be an orthonormal set of basis
functions on Rd (e.g., principal components, complex exponentials or wavelet functions). Write
D = [Dretained, Dfiltered], where Dretained ∈ Rd×kr and Dfiltered ∈ Rd×kf are the subsets of retained
and filtered basis functions, respectively, and k = kr+kf . We can write x using the basis functions
as
x = Dretainedzr +Dfilteredzf ,
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Figure 4: Top 1 accuracy of each of the defense methods investigated in this manuscript on FGSM,
I-FGSM and C&W adversarial examples, in a gray-box setting. The examples were generated and
tested on Inception-v3.
where zr, zf are vectors describing the coefficients of each basis function in the representation
of x. Let Jθ,y(x) be the loss of a neural net with parameter θ for the example (x, y), and let
∇xJ(x, y; θ) ∈ Rd be its corresponding gradient w.r.t x. A Filtered Gradient Attack would only
modify zr. This can be done by computing the gradient of the loss w.r.t zr, using the chain rule:
∇zrJθ,y =
∂x
∂zr
· ∇xJθ,y
= DTlow∇xJθ,y. (1)
The gradient ∇zrJθ,y in (1) is defined in the kr-dimensional space of functions in Dretained. To
map it back to Rd, one should multiply it from the left by Dretained, which defines the adversarial
perturbation in the input space Rd as
DretainedD
T
retained∇xJθ,y(x). (2)
Equation (2) simply describes a filtered gradient∇xJθ,y(x), hence the attack name. Some cases
of special interest are where the retained basis functions correspond to low frequency terms, first
9
Figure 5: Top 1 accuracy of each of the defense methods investigated in this manuscript in a white-
box setting, using BPDA and FGA attacks.
principal components, or coarse wavelet functions; in these cases the FGA perturbation is smoother
than usual adversarial perturbations. More generally, we can apply any of the de-noising procedures
in this manuscript on the gradient, to obtain a smooth adversarial perturbation. In this section we
apply each of the de-noising procedures in this manner within a FGSM attack, which results in the
following procedure, applied to a raw image x:
1. Forward-propagate x through the net, and compute its loss.
2. Obtain the gradient∇xJθ,y(x) of the loss w.r.t x.
3. De-noise the gradient to get den(Jθ,y(x)).
4. xadversarial = clip(x+  · sgn(den(Jθ,y(x))).
Backward Pass Differentiable Approximation (BPDA): This attack was proposed in Athalye
et al. (2018) for cases where it is hard or impossible to compute the gradient of a pre-processor
which is applied as defense. Specifically, we can view the de-noising defense as the first layer
of the neural net, which performs pre-processing of the input. When this pre-processing is differ-
entiable, standard attacks can be utilized. When it is impossible to compute the gradient of the
pre-processing, Athalye et al. propose to approximate it using the identity function, which they
justify since the pre-processing step computes a function g(x) ≈ x. We apply this logic within a
FGSM framework, which results in the following procedure, applied to a raw image x:
1. De-noise x using any of the defense methods to get den(x)
2. Forward-propagate the den(x) through the net, and compute its loss.
3. Obtain the gradient∇xJθ,y(den(x)) of the loss w.r.t to the de-noised image.
4. xadversarial = clip(x+  · sgn(∇xJθ,y(den(x))).
We tested the FGA and BPDA using all defense techniques considered in this work; the results
are shown in Figure 5. As can be seen, JPEG appears to be the most successful defense among all
tested defenses, under both attack schemes.
5 Conclusions and Future Work
We explored various pre-processing techniques as defenses against adversarial attacks by applying
them as test-time pre-processing procedures and measuring their performance under gray, black and
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white-box settings. Our results empirically show that in a black-box setting, JPEG compression and
soft-thresholding perform best, while the former outperforms all other tested defenses in gray-box
and the two white-box setting considered. In addition, we proposed the Filtered Gradient Attack,
a novel white-box attack scheme, where only components corresponding to a pre-defined basis
functions are changed. A special case of FGA is a ’low-frequency’ attack.
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